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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Appellant was charged with the crime of burglary 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) , as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of the crime of burglary 
by a jury in the Court of the Honorable Gordon R. Hall on 
November 4, 1975. Appellant was sentenced to serve the 
indeterminate term provided by law in the Utah State Prison, 
namely, zero to five years. 
Case No. 
14357 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two girls were driving south on State Street 
in Salt Lake City shortly after midnight on May 9, 1975. 
Near a pawn shop at 1588 South State Street, the girls 
saw appellant who appeared to be hitchhiking (T. 4). The 
girls pulled over and talked to appellant for a short 
time and then drove off (T.5). The girls drove on down 
State Street, turned around, and drove back past appellant. 
At this time, he was looking in the windows of the pawn 
shop (T.6). The girls drove north and turned again and 
proceeded south a second time. This time as they went 
by they saw appellant in front of the pawn shop with 
something in his hands. One of the girls said: 
"I seen him standing in front 
of Pahl's about the door, facing 
northeast; and he had something in 
his hands and was wrapping a cord 
around it. 
Q. Could you describe what that 
something was? 
A. It was black and it had silver 
around it. Looked like an eight track 
or, you know, a stereo of some kind." 
(T.6). 
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The girls also said that one of the store windows 
had been broken, and that a bag of golf clubs was hanging 
out of the break in the window (T.7). The girls continued 
south on State Street, turned around again and proceeded 
north. This time a police officer was at the pawn shop. 
He had answered a burglar alarm (T.35). The girls 
stopped and told the police officer about appellant (T.8) . 
The officer arrested appellant a short distance away and 
brought him back. The girls identified him as the person they 
had previously observed (T.9). 
Appellant testified that he noticed a disturbance 
at the pawn shop and came to see what was going on when an 
officer apprehended him (T.60). He claimed that he was not 
involved whatsoever in breaking the window or in any burglary 
(T.63). No stolen items were found in his possession or at 
his apartment (T.43). 
The girls also testified that when they first saw 
appellant he had a plastic bag with something white in it 
and that he appeared to be very drunk (T.5,24,26), although 
they could smell no alcohol (T.33). Officer English testified 
that he thought appellant was intoxicated but that he could 
not smell alcohol. Later he found several empty glue tubes 
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in appellant's apartment. The officer then said he 
recognized the odor of glue coming from appellant (T.38). 
Appellant was later taken to the hospital for treatment 
of a possible overdose of glue fumes (T.44). Finally, 
Officer English testified that some of the broken 
window glass had glue on it and that a plastic bag was 
found directly below the broken window (T.40). Further-
more, Officer English testified that appellant had several 
particles or slivers of glass on his right coat sleeve 
(T.37). 
During the trial, appellant made a motion to 
have instructions submitted to the jury concerning lesser 
included offenses such as attempted burglary, criminal 
mischief, or trespassing (T.71). The motion was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSES. 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse his convic-
tion because the trial court refused to instruct the jury 
on lesser included offenses of burglary. Respondent replies 
that the trial judge acted correctly. The law of burglary 
- A -
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in Utah was clearly broken. The conviction was supported 
by ample evidence, and there was no evidence to support any 
instructions as asked for by appellant* 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1975) , provides: 
"(1) A person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters . . . a 
building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit 
a felony or theft. . . . " 
Entry is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (Supp. 1975}, 
as: 
11
 (4) 'Enter1 means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part 
of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical 
object under control of the actor." 
Thus, it is obvious that a man is guilty of burglary if he 
breaks a window of a building with intent to steal soaaething 
from it. It does not matter how he breaks the window; whether 
it be by striking it with his arm or throwing a rock through 
it. 
Respondent submits that there is ample evidence 
on which to convict appellant of burglary. He was seen in 
the vicinity, he was seen carrying something from the window, 
glue was found on the broken glass and slivers were found in 
his coat, and golf clubs were hanging out the window (T.6, 
37,40). 
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Furthermore there is no intent problem. That 
issue was raised and denied in the trial court 
and has not been raised on appeal. There is ample evidence 
to support the intent to steal if that question had been 
raised. 
As to the lesser included offenses, appellant 
has correctly cited the law. As he points out: 
" . . . the failure to present 
for the jury's consideration a 
party's theory by appropriate 
instructions constitutes reversible 
error." State v. Newtonf 144 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1943). 
However: 
" . . . the defendant is entitled 
to have the jury instructed on his 
theory of the case if there is any 
substantial evidence to justify giving 
such instructions." State v. Johnson, 
185 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1947). 
(Emphasis added.) 
That holding has been affirmed more recently by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 
70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969). 
In a later case, the test was modified somewhat. 
In State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970), 
the Court held that the lesser included offense should be 
offered if ". . . any reasonable view of the evidence 
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would support such a verdict." Id., at 812. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court went on to say: 
". • . in this situation where the 
question raised relates to the refusal 
to submit included offenses, it is our 
duty to survey the whole evidence and 
the inferences naturally to be deduced 
therefrom to see whether there is any 
reasonable basis therein which would 
support a conviction of the lesser 
offenses." 463 P.2d at 814. 
As we examine the evidence it will become apparent 
that there is no "substantial" or "reasonable" evidence on which 
to base the requested instruction. "Attempt" is defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 1975), as follows: 
"(1). . . a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the 
offense, he engages in conduct constituting 
a substantial step towards commission of 
the offense." 
Therefore, in order to have an attempted burglary 
it would be necessary to have a man take a substantial step 
towards breaking the glass, but without breaking it or causing 
any other entry. Once the glass was broken an entry had to 
have been made and the crime can no longer be an attenqat 
under the Utah statute. Someone broke that glass, and if 
that same person had the intent to steal, there was a burglary. 
An attempted burglary simply cannot be reasonably construed 
under any view of the evidence. 
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As for trespass, that term is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (Supp. 1975): 
"(2) A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in 
sections 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains 
unlawfully on property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance 
or injury . . . 
(ii) Intends to commit any 
crime, other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to 
whether his presence will cause fear 
II 
. . . . 
Appellant had not one shred of evidence that he entered the 
pawn shop with one of the above intents. He testified that 
he was not even there. Thus, he was basing his entire 
defense on mistaken identity. It was burglary or nothing, 
with no middle ground. 
Finally, as to criminal mischief, that is defined 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (Supp. 1975): 
"(1) A person commits criminal 
mischief if: 
(a) . . . he damages or destroys 
property with the intention of defrauding 
an insurer; or 
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully 
tampers with the property of another and 
thereby: 
(i) Recklessly endangers 
human life; or 
(ii) Recklessly causes .... 
a substantial interception or impair-
ment of any public utility; or 
(c) He intentionally damages, 
defaces, or destroys the property of 
another*" 
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Again, appellant put forth not the least shred of evidence 
which would support an instruction on this crime. He said 
he had nothing to do with it. This was a case of committing 
either burglary or nothing, and the jury found that appellant 
was guilty as charged. 
CONCLUSION 
Since, under the Utah statute, burglary is defined 
as the slightest entrance coupled with an intent to steal, it 
is obvious that a broken glass window makes out a prima facie 
case as far as "entrance" goes. If that entrance is coupled 
with an intent then burglary is committed. The crime has 
gone too far to be an attempt. It is impossible to support a 
lesser included offense instruction by any reasonable view of 
the evidence in this case. Appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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